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Private information retrieval (PIR) schemes allow a user to retrieve the i th
bit of an n-bit data string x, replicated in k2 databases (in the information-
theoretic setting) or in k1 databases (in the computational setting), while
keeping the value of i private. The main cost measure for such a scheme is
its communication complexity. In this paper we introduce a model of sym-
metrically-private information retrieval (SPIR), where the privacy of the
data, as well as the privacy of the user, is guaranteed. That is, in every
invocation of a SPIR protocol, the user learns only a single physical bit of x
and no other information about the data. Previously known PIR schemes
severely fail to meet this goal. We show how to transform PIR schemes into
SPIR schemes (with information-theoretic privacy), paying a constant factor
in communication complexity. To this end, we introduce and utilize a new
cryptographic primitive, called conditional disclosure of secrets, which we
believe may be a useful building block for the design of other cryptographic
protocols. In particular, we get a k-database SPIR scheme of complexity
O(n1(2k&1)) for every constant k2 and an O(log n)-database SPIR scheme
of complexity O(log2 n } log log n). All our schemes require only a single
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round of interaction, and are resilient to any dishonest behavior of the user.
These results also yield the first implementation of a distributed version of
( n1)-OT (1-out-of-n oblivious transfer) with information-theoretic security and
sublinear communication complexity.  2000 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
Private information retrieval (PIR) schemes allow a user to retrieve information
from a database while maintaining its query private. In this model, the database is
viewed as an n-bit string x out of which the user retrieves the i th bit xi , while giving
the database no information about the index i. The main cost measure for such
schemes is their communication complexity. The notion of PIR was introduced in
[12], where it was shown that if there is only one copy of the database available
then n bits of communication are needed (for information-theoretic user privacy).
However, if there are k2 noncommunicating copies of the database, then there
are solutions with much better (sublinear) communication complexity.
In this paper, we introduce the stronger model of symmetrically private informa-
tion retrieval (SPIR), where privacy of the data, as well as of the user, is guaran-
teed. That is, every invocation of a SPIR scheme, in addition to maintaining the
user’s privacy, prevents the user (even a dishonest one) from obtaining any infor-
mation other than a single physical bit of the data. Data privacy is a natural and
crucial requirement in many settings. For example, consider a commercial database
which sells information, such as stock information, to users, charging by the
amount of data that the user retrieved. Here, both user privacy and data privacy
are essential.
The original PIR model was only concerned with user privacy, without requiring
any protection of data privacy. Indeed, previous PIR schemes allow the user to
obtain other physical bits of the data (i.e., xj for j{i ) or other information such
as the exclusive-or of certain subsets of the bits of x. A good example of this is a
single invocation of the best two-database information-theoretic scheme currently
known [12], from which a user can systematically retrieve 3(n13) physical bits of
data (see Section 5, Example 2).
To efficiently realize SPIR schemes, we introduce and utilize a new cryptographic
primitive, called the conditional disclosure of secrets, which may also be of inde-
pendent interest as a building block for designing more general cryptographic
protocols. Informally, conditional disclosure of secrets allows a set of players to dis-
close a secret to an external party Carol, subject to a given condition on their joint
inputs. In the setting we consider, Carol knows all the inputs held by the players
except for the secret to be conditionally disclosed, so she knows whether the condi-
tion holds and whether she will obtain the secret. Each player on the other hand
only sees its portion of the input and does not necessarily know whether Carol will
obtain the secret. The protocol involves only a unidirectional communication from
the players to Carol. A simple example that illustrates the use of the conditional
disclosure of secrets is one in which each player has the input bit bi , indicating
whether it agrees to reveal the secret s to Carol. Carol obtains the secret s subject
to the condition that the majority of the players agree to reveal the secret.
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This work is concerned with the information-theoretic setting for SPIR. The
techniques used in this work can also be applied to computational PIR schemes (c.f.
[11, 23, 10]), in which the privacy requirement is relaxed to computational privacy
(against computationally bounded databases). However, in this computational set-
ting a better solution for realizing SPIR may be constructed using pseudo-random
functions [24, 14]. We note that in addition to their theoretical significance and
their unconditional security, information theoretic schemes possess other advan-
tages over known computational schemes; they are much more time-efficient, and
their communication complexity is typically smaller for moderately sized data
strings (even when their asymptotic complexity is higher).
Realizing SPIR involves a modification to the previous multidatabase model.
This is necessary because information-theoretic SPIR schemes, regardless of their
complexity, cannot possibly be achieved in the original PIR setting in which the
databases do not interact with each other at all (see Appendix A.1). We thus use
a minimal extension of the original setting: continue to disallow direct interaction
between the databases, but grant them access to a shared random string, unknown
to the user. A similar kind of extension has been studied before in the contexts of
private computation [16, 18], noninteractive zero-knowledge [6], and other
scenarios. Here, this extension is particularly natural since, even in the basic PIR
setting, databases are required to maintain identical copies of the same data string.
(In the next subsection we discuss an alternative approach of using shared pseudo-
random strings rather than sharing truly random strings.)
1.1. Our Results
We construct efficient SPIR schemes, with sublinear communication complexity,
which may be even further improved if better PIR schemes are designed. More
precisely, we present transformations from PIR schemes to SPIR schemes, preserv-
ing the user’s privacy and guaranteeing data privacy as well, with a small penalty
in the communication complexity. We give two types of reductions.
A general reduction. We show that using any PIR scheme it is possible to con-
struct a SPIR scheme with the same number of rounds, a constant factor overhead
in communication complexity, and linear (in n) shared randomness (per query).
The resultant SPIR scheme requires the use of an additional auxiliary database,
which does not need to hold the original data (only the shared random string).
That is, we achieve:
v (k+1)-database SPIR scheme of communication complexity O(C(n)), for
any k-database PIR scheme of complexity C(n).
However, the additional database requirement may be costly. In particular, it
does not allow us to obtain an information-theoretic sublinear SPIR solution with
only two databases. This case is important, since two is the minimal number of
databases required for such a solution to exist. Indeed, via more specific reductions
we manage to avoid the additional database and in particular obtain a good solution
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for the two-database case. Moreover, these specific reductions require significantly
less shared randomness.
Specific reductions. We present reductions which exploit specific structural
properties of existing PIR schemes to transform them into SPIR schemes which use
the same number of databases as the underlying PIR scheme, communication com-
plexity which is at most a small constant factor over the PIR scheme, and shared
randomness complexity (per query) which is of the same order of magnitude as the
communication complexity. In particular, extending schemes from [12, 1] we
obtain:
v k-database SPIR scheme of complexity O(n1(2k&1)) for any constant k2;
v O(log n)-database SPIR scheme of complexity O(log2 n } log log n).
Our schemes maintain the general paradigm of existing PIR schemes: all data-
bases hold an identical copy of x, and all protocols use a single queriesanswers
round.
If one is willing to settle for computational privacy of the data (while still main-
taining the information-theoretic privacy of the user) then we can also consider a
slight variation of the model, by replacing the shared random strings with pseudo-
random ones. More specifically, the databases may share a short random seed from
which longer shared pseudo-random strings can be generated on the fly, without
extra communication [7, 28]. This allows the databases to save storage space and
save on the amount of random bits they need to produce. We also remark that by
using pseudo-random functions [17] it is possible for the databases, in each execu-
tion of the protocol, to directly expand from the seed only the portion of the
expanded string that is needed for this particular execution (without actually
expanding the whole string).
Our results, as of most cited PIR works, concentrate mainly on the case of
1-privacy. The more general notion of t-privacy requires that the view of any collu-
sion of t databases is independent of the user’s retrieval index i. A generalization of
our SPIR protocols that satisfies this stronger t-privacy requirement is described
later in the paper (Subsection 6.2).
Note that we restrict our attention to retrieval of single bits, rather than the
retrieval of blocks consisting of multibit records. In Subsection 6.1 we address block
retrieval and show that for single-round schemes, concentrating on single-bit
records does not compromise generality. We then describe how to generalize our
results for multi-round schemes as well, achieving SPIR for multibit records.
Finally, an interesting observation is that the SPIR problem may be viewed as
a distributed version of a known cryptographic primitive called ( n1)-oblivious-trans-
fer (OT) [25, 15, 8, 9]. An ( n1)-OT protocol allows Bob to secretly choose one of
n secret bits held by Alice in a way that at the end of the protocol Bob learns only
a single bit of his choice and Alice learns nothing about Bob’s choice. The results
of our work give the first 1-round distributed implementations of ( n1)-OT with infor-
mation-theoretic security and sublinear communication complexity. Since ( n1)-OT is
a useful tool for cryptographic protocol design, it is our hope that SPIR might also
be found a useful tool for the design of cryptographic protocols.
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1.2. Related Work
Private information retrieval (with information-theoretic user privacy) was intro-
duced in [12], where the schemes achieve communication complexity of O(n13)
bits with two databases: O(n1k) bits with k3 databases and O(log2 n log log n)
bits with k=O(log n) databases. In [1] the k-database upper bound is improved
to O(n1(2k&1)) for any constant k (see [19] for improved dependence on k and
generalization to t-privacy).
The computational counterpart of PIR (i.e., schemes where the user-privacy is
only with respect to polynomial-time databases, relying on certain intractability
assumptions) was first considered in [11]; they show how to obtain schemes with
communication complexity O(nc) (for any constant c>0) for k=2 databases,
assuming the existence of one-way functions. The first computational PIR scheme
for a single database was obtained in [23], achieving communication complexity
O(nc) (for any constant c>0), under the quadratic residuosity assumption.
A single-database computational PIR with polylogarithmic communication com-
plexity is presented in [10], under a new intractability assumption called the 8-hid-
ing assumption. All the above schemes require only a single round of queries and
answers. In [4] it is shown that a necessary assumption for any single database
PIR with less than n communication complexity is the existence of one-way func-
tions. In [14] this result is strengthened to show that oblivious transfer is necessary
for PIR.
Subsequent to our work, the computational counterpart of SPIR has been
addressed in [24, 14], showing an efficient transformation from (single-database,
low communication) PIR to SPIR (in [24] a transformation is constructed assum-
ing a 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer primitive, and in [14] the assumption is removed
by constructing this primitive from PIR).
1.3. Organization
In Section 2 we introduce notations and basic definitions. In Section 3 we show
a general transformation of PIR schemes into SPIR schemes, including the intro-
duction of the conditional disclosure of secrets in Subsection 3.2. The following sec-
tions present specific schemes which outperform the ones obtained by applying the
general transformation. Section 4 includes SPIR schemes which rely on the user
being honest. In Section 5 we present schemes which keep the data private from
any, possibly dishonest, user (with a minor extra communication cost). Section 6
contains extensions and a generalization of our results: Subsection 6.1 generalizes
the results for block retrieval of multibit records, Subsection 6.2 generalizes the
results to schemes with higher levels of user-privacy (that is, privacy against coali-
tions of databases), and Subsection 6.3 outlines a generalization of SPIR, called
private retrieval with costs, where our techniques and results can be used. Finally,
Appendix A.1 contains a proof of the impossibility of SPIR in the usual PIR setting
(without direct interaction between the databases or shared randomness), and
Appendix A.2 gives a lower bound on the amount of shared randomness necessary
for our general PIR to SPIR transformation.
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2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1. General Notations and Definitions
The following notations and conventions are used throughout the paper. Let [l]
denote the set [1, 2, ..., l] and let Zl =
def [0, 1, ..., l&1] denote the additive group
of residues modulo l. For any two sets S, S$, let SS$ denote the symmetric dif-
ference between S and S$ (i.e., SS$=(S"S$) _ (S$"S)). For a set S[l] let /S
denote the characteristic vector of S: an l-bit binary string whose j th bit is equal
to 1 iff j # S. To simplify notation, S j and /j are used instead of S[ j] and /[ j] ,
respectively. For any binary string _ # [0, 1]d, let weight(_) denote the number of
nonzero entries in _ (in particular 0weight(_)d). For any n-tuple y and index
set B[n], let y |B denote the restriction of y to its entries with indices from B. By
default, whenever referring to a random choice of an element from a finite domain
A, the associated distribution is uniform over A, and this random choice is inde-
pendent of all other random choices. Finally, addition and multiplication opera-
tions will sometimes be carried over a finite field or group, as implied by the
context.
A Boolean function h: [0, 1]m  [0, 1] is called monotone if for every A, B[m]
s.t. AB, if h(/A)=1 then also h(/B)=1. A Boolean formula over the variables
y1 , ..., yn is a labeled binary tree whose leaves (representing inputs) are labeled by
literals from [ y1 , y1 , ..., yn , yn ], and whose internal nodes (representing Boolean
operators) are labeled by ‘‘7’’ or ‘‘6’’. Such a formula computes a Boolean func-
tion h: [0, 1]n  [0, 1] in the natural way. A formula is said to be monotone if all
of its leaves are labeled by positive literals (which implies that the function that the
formula computes is monotone). Finally, the size of a formula is measured by the
number of leaves.
2.2. PIR Schemes
Let k denote the number of databases, DBj (for 1 jk) denote the j th
database, x denote an n-bit data string which is held by each of the k databases,
U denote the user, and i denote the position (also called index) of a data bit that
the user wants to retrieve (1in).
A PIR scheme is a randomized protocol between U and DB1 , ..., DBk , where U
has an access to a random input \, unknown to the databases, and DB1 , ..., DBk
have access to a shared random input r, unknown to the user.4 In each round of
the protocol messages are exchanged between the user and the databases: queries
are sent from the user to each database, and answers are sent from each database
to the user.5 The view of the user in the protocol, denoted viewU (x, i, r, \), consists
of its input i, its random input \, and all the answers received from the k databases
during the execution of the protocol (with inputs x, i, r, \). Similarly, the view of
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4 It is assumed, without loss of generality, that all databases are otherwise deterministic.
5 As is the case in most of the PIR literature, we will mostly be interested in single-round schemes.
The following definitions may take a slightly simpler form when the schemes are restricted to a single
round.
the j th database, denoted view j (x, i, r, \), consists of the data string x, the shared
random input r, and all the queries sent from the user to DBj during the execution
of the protocol. At the end of the execution, the user applies some reconstruction
function 9 to its view and outputs the corresponding value 9(viewU (x, i, r, \)).
A party (user or database) in a PIR scheme is called honest if it follows the
protocol’s specification. When the user U interacts with (possibly dishonest)
databases DB1* , ..., DBk* , we denote the view of the j th database by view j*
(x, i, r, \). Similarly, when the k databases DB1 , ..., DBk interact with a (possibly
dishonest) user U* we denote the view of the user by view*U (x, i, r, \).
A (1-private, information-theoretic) PIR scheme is a protocol as above, which
satisfies the following two requirements:
(1) correctness: When both the user and the k databases are honest, the user
always reconstructs the data bit xi . That is, for every x, i, r, \ as above,
9(viewU (x, i, r, \))=xi .
(2) user-privacy: The view of any single database is independent of the
retrieval index i. Formally, for any (possibly dishonest) databases DB1* , ..., DBk*
interacting with the (honest) user U, for any shared random input r, any data string
x, any two retrieval indices 1i, i $n, any database index 1 jk, and any view
viewj of DBj* ,
Pr\[view j*(x, i, r, \)=view j]=Pr\[view j*(x, i $, r, \)=view j].
It should be noted that the definition of PIR schemes in the literature does not
allow for a shared randomness between the databases. However, in the context of
PIR the definitions are equivalent. It is only in the SPIR context where the shared-
randomness becomes crucial.
2.3. SPIR Schemes
A SPIR scheme is a PIR scheme such that in any invocation of the scheme, the
user cannot learn any information which does not follow from a single physical bit
of data. Formally, a SPIR scheme should satisfy, in addition to the correctness and
the user-privacy requirements, the following third requirement:
(3) data privacy: For any (possibly dishonest) user U* interacting with the
honest databases DB1 , ..., DBk , and for any random input \ held by U*, and any
i $, there exists an index i, such that for all data strings x, y satisfying xi= yi , and
every view view of U*,
Prr[view*U (x, i $, r, \)=view]=Prr [view*U ( y, i $, r, \)=view].
Let us argue that the above definition yields the intuitive notion of data privacy.
The intuitive notion that we want to capture is that the user cannot learn any infor-
mation about the data which does not follow from a single physical bit. One may
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be tempted to require that for any user U* there exists a single index i, such that
the view of U* is independent of the data string x given xi . However, this
(stronger) variant of the definition cannot be satisfied. To see that, consider a SPIR
scheme S satisfying this latter requirement, and consider a user U* which starts by
randomly choosing an index i and then proceeds to run according to S with
retrieval index i. Clearly, there is no single index i such that the view of such user
depends on xi alone. What our definition requires is that, for every random string
\ held by the user, the user must (explicitly or implicitly) fix an index i such that
its view depends only on xi .6 Finally, note that an equivalent formulation of the
data-privacy requirement is the following one: For any deterministic user U*, there
exists an index i, such that the user’s view is independent of the data string x given xi .
An honest-user SPIR scheme is a PIR scheme that satisfies the data-privacy
requirement with respect to U, the honest (but curious) user, which follows the
scheme’s specification but may try to deduce extra information from the com-
munication.
Note that the above formulation of the model is only concerned with answering
a single retrieval query made by a single user. Multiple queries (possibly originating
from different users) may be handled by independent repetitions of the single-query
scheme, where in each invocation the databases use an independent source of
shared randomness (or a ‘‘fresh’’ portion of a single shared random string).
By default, the terms PIR scheme and SPIR scheme refer to 1-round, 1-query,
information theoretically private schemes.
2.4. Complexity
The main complexity measure for PIR and SPIR schemes is their communication
complexity. The communication complexity of a k-database scheme will be denoted
(:k (n), ;k (n)), where :k (n) is the total number of query bits sent from the user to
all k databases and ;k (n) is the total number of answer bits sent from all k
databases to the user, when the data string is of size n. We sometimes use a single
parameter to measure the communication complexity of a given scheme, which is
the total communication complexity :k (n)+;k (n).
The shared randomness complexity of a SPIR scheme is defined as the entropy of
the shared random input r (which equals the length of the string r in the case where
it is uniformly distributed over all strings of some fixed length).
Finally, while the definitions in Subsections 2.2 and 2.3 do not address the aspect
of computational efficiency, all protocols constructed in this work will also be com-
putationally efficient (that is, polynomial in n).
3. A GENERAL REDUCTION FROM SPIR TO PIR
In this section we present a construction of a SPIR scheme by using any PIR
scheme as a black box. This construction introduces an overhead of a single
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6 Also note that if the user has some a priori information regarding the data string x (e.g., that xj=x i)
then the retrieval of xi , together with its a priori information, may give it information about other bits
of x; this is obviously unavoidable.
auxiliary database, a constant factor in communication complexity, and a linear
amount of shared randomness over the corresponding PIR scheme. The auxiliary
database need not hold a copy of the data string x; it only needs to have access to
the shared random string r.
More specifically, we present two general reductions. The first is with respect to
an honest user and costs only an additive logarithmic factor in communication
complexity (Subsection 3.1). The second strengthens the first to deal with any user,
possibly dishonest (Subsection 3.3). The latter is constructed by utilizing a new
cryptographic primitive, called the conditional disclosure of secrets (introduced in
Subsection 3.2), which will also be used in later sections. We note that both reduc-
tions (Theorems 1 and 3) are stated and proved for a single round PIR, but can be
generalized to apply to PIR schemes with any number of rounds.
3.1. A General Reduction with Respect to Honest Users
Theorem 1. Let P be any 1-round k-database PIR scheme with communication
complexity (:k (n), ;k (n)). Then, there exists a 1-round (k+1)-database honest-user
SPIR scheme SP with communication complexity (:k (n)+(k+1) Wlog2 nX,
;k (n)+1) and shared randomness complexity n.
Proof. To simplify notation, assume that the index i is taken from the set
Zn=[0, 1, ..., n&1] (rather than from [n]). The scheme SP involves k databases
DB1 , ..., DBk , corresponding to databases of the original scheme P, and an
auxiliary database DB0 . All databases share a random string r # [0, 1]n. The
scheme SP proceeds as follows:
Queries: First the user picks queries q1 , ..., qk as specified by the PIR scheme
P and independently picks a random shift amount 2 # Zn . Then the user sends to
each DBj , for 1 jk, the same shift amount 2j=2, along with the query qj .
Finally, the user sends the shifted index i $ =def (i&2) mod n to DB0 .
Answers: Each database DBj , for 1 jk, locally computes a virtual data
string x$ =def x (r>>2), where  denotes bitwise exclusive-or and r>>2 denotes
a cyclic shift of the random string r by 2 places to the right. Then, DBj answers
the query qj as it would do in the original PIR scheme P with respect to the com-
puted string x$. Finally, the auxiliary database DB0 replies with the single bit ri $ .
Reconstruction: The user reconstructs xi by first reconstructing from the
answers of DB1 , ..., DBk a bit bP according to PIR scheme P and then computing
the exclusive-or of this bit with the bit ri $ received from DB0 .
By the correctness of P, we have bP=x$i . Therefore, the reconstruction step of
SP yields bP r i $=x$i r i $=(xi r i $)r i $=x i , which proves the correctness of
SP . The user’s privacy follows from the privacy of P and from the fact that each
of the additional queries 2 and i $ is uniformly distributed in Zn , independent of the
P-queries q1 , ..., qk . Finally, to show that the scheme SP meets the data-privacy
requirement with respect to the honest user, we will use the following, more general,
claim.
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Claim 1. Let q=(i $, (q1 , 21), (q2 , 22), ..., (qk , 2k)) be any (k+1)-tuple of
queries ( possibly, but not necessarily, picked by an honest user). Moreover, suppose
that 21=22= } } } =2k =
def 2. Then, the joint answers of DB0 , ..., DBk to their corre-
sponding queries in q are independent of x given xi $+2 (where the probability space
is over the choice of r, and where the sum i $+2 is taken modulo n).
Proof. Let x$ =def x (r>>2). Note that x$ is the virtual data string computed
by each database DBj , 1 jk, in the process of answering to its own query from
q, i.e., qj . Now, consider the joint distribution of (x$, ri $). This distribution is
uniform over the set
[( y, b) : y # [0, 1]n, b # [0, 1], yi $+2 b=xi $+2],
thus depending only on xi $+2 . Since x$ determines the answers of DB1 , ..., DBk
given the query-tuple q, and since ri $ is the answer of DB0 , it follows that the joint
distribution of all answers given such query-tuple q depends on xi $+2 alone. K
Claim 1 implies that the distribution of the view of an honest user, given that it
holds input i and random input \, depends only on a single data bit, because an
honest user sets 21=22= } } } =2k=2. This shows the data-privacy of SP with
respect to an honest user, and concludes the proof of Theorem 1. K
Note that in the above scheme SP , a dishonest user can either send invalid
P-queries, or send different shifts 2j to different databases. However, by Claim 1,
only the latter dishonest behavior could potentially give the user more information
on the data. In other words, if the user sends the same shifts to all databases, then
data-privacy will always be maintained, regardless of the validity of the other
queries. Thus, to extend this scheme for a dishonest user, it would suffice to have
the databases (each of which sees only a single 2j) send their answers disguised so
that the user learns the answers only if the condition 21= } } } =2k is satisfied. To
this end, we use the primitive of conditional disclosure of secrets, introduced in the
next subsection.
A natural question regarding the above transformation is whether its shared ran-
domness complexity may be reduced. A partial answer to this question is given in
Appendix A.2, where it is shown that for our transformation to be general (i.e.
applicable to any underlying PIR scheme), the shared n-bit string used there must
be uniformly distributed over [0, 1]n, namely linear shared randomness is required
regardless of the communication complexity of the underlying PIR scheme.
Finally, we note that Claim 2 implies that if P is the trivial 1-database PIR
scheme in which the entire data string is being sent to the user, then the two-
database SPIR scheme SP constructed above is resilient also against a dishonest
user. We thus have:
Corollary 1. There exists a 1-round, 2-database SPIR scheme S2* with com-
munication complexity (2 Wlog2nX, n+1), and shared randomness complexity n.
While this scheme S2* is inefficient on its own, as it requires linear communica-
tion complexity, it will be used as a subprotocol (with small data strings) in our
later constructions.
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3.2. Conditional Disclosure of Secrets
In this subsection we describe and implement a new cryptographic primitive,
called conditional disclosure of secrets (or CDS for short). This primitive is then
used in the next subsection to obtain a general reduction from SPIR to PIR
withstanding any user behavior.
Informally, the conditional disclosure setting involves k players, each holding
some input, and an external party Carol, who knows all inputs held by the players.
In addition, there is a secret s which is known to at least one of the players but not
to Carol. The goal is for the players to disclose the secret to Carol, subject to a
given condition on their joint input (namely if the condition holds, Carol learns the
secret, and if it does not she obtains no information about the secret). The model
allows all the players to have access to a shared random string (hidden from
Carol), and the only communication allowed is a single unidirectional message sent
from each player to Carol. A simple example illustrating the use of CDS is one in
which each player has an input bit bi # [0, 1], and the condition for disclosing the
secret to Carol is that the majority of the players’ bits are set to 1.
A formal definition is given below. For convenience, we start by defining a ver-
sion where the secret s to be disclosed is known to all players (we call this version
conditional disclosure of a common secret).
Let h: [0, 1]n  [0, 1] be a fixed boolean function (the condition); let B1 , ..., Bk
be a partition of [n] into k sets (each Bj [n] is called the j th player input por-
tion); and let SD be some secret domain (e.g., all binary strings of a particular
length). A conditional disclosure of a common secret for the condition h, input parti-
tion B1 , ..., Bk , and secret domain SD consists of a set of k players P1 , ..., Pk
(modeled as functions) and (an external party) Carol, as follows. Let r denote a
shared random input of the players, drawn from some distribution R. For any fixed
y= y1 } } } yn # [0, 1]n (the input), s # SD (the secret), and 1 jk, we define a ran-
dom variable mj=Pj ( y |Bj , s, r) (the j th player message), where the randomness is
over the choice of r. Then the following two conditions must hold:
1. correctness: For every y # [0, 1]n, if h( y)=1, then \s, r, Carol( y, m1 , ...,
mk)=s. That is, if the condition holds, then Carol is always able to reconstruct the
secret s from her input and the messages she received.
2. secrecy: For every y # [0, 1]n, if h( y)=0, then for any s0 , s1 # SD the
k-tuples of random variables (ms0j =Pj ( y |Bj , s0 , r))
k
j=1 and (m
s1
j =Pj ( y |Bj , s1 , r))
k
j=1
are identically distributed (where the probability is over the choice of r). That is,
if the condition does not hold, Carol obtains no information about the secret s (the
messages received by Carol are identically distributed for any two possible secrets
s0 and s1).
A similar version can be defined when the secret s is known to at least one of the
players (not necessarily to all of them). In this case we let mj=Pj ( y |Bj , r) for
players Pj who do not hold s (their message is constructed only based on their por-
tion of the input and the shared randomness). We call this (more general) version
conditional disclosure of a secret.
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The communication complexity of a conditional disclosure protocol is the maxi-
mal total size of all messages sent by the players (over the choices of r), and its
shared randomness complexity is the entropy of R.
We note that the model of conditional disclosure is similar to the noninteractive
model of private computation from [16], which is described in Subsection 4.2.
Known results in that (in a sense more general) model are sufficient to yield some
solutions to the conditional disclosure problem. For instance, results of [16, 18]
imply conditional disclosure protocols with communication which is quadratic in
the size of a branching program or a formula describing the condition h (see
Remark 2 for discussion). However, the solutions obtained via these general results
are usually not efficient enough for our purposes. Instead, we show below how to
achieve much more efficient solutions, which use communication at most linear in
the size of h.
3.2.1. Reduction to Generalized Secret Sharing
In the following we show how to implement conditional disclosure of secrets
under an arbitrary condition by reducing it to generalized secret sharing [5, 20]
relative to a corresponding access structure.
Generalized secret sharing. The problem of generalized secret sharing is an
extension of the usual notion of t-out-of-m secret sharing [26]. Informally, a
generalized secret sharing protocol is a randomized protocol for sharing a secret
into m shares such that the secret can be reconstructed from any qualified set of
shares, whereas any combination of an unqualified set of shares should give no
information about the secret. Formally, a generalized secret sharing scheme with
secret domain SD is defined by a triple (D, R, C), where D (the dealing function)
maps a secret s # SD and a random input r into an m-tuple of shares (s1 , ..., sm) ,
R is the distribution from which the random input r is chosen, and C (the
reconstruction function) maps a set A[m] and an |A|-tuple of shares into a
reconstructed secret s # SD. The collection of qualified sets is specified by a
monotone Boolean function hM : [0, 1]m  [0, 1], called an access structure, where
a set A[m] of shares is said to be qualified if hM (/A)=1 and otherwise is said
to be unqualified. The scheme S=(D, R, C) is said to be a generalized secret
sharing scheme realizing the access structure hM if it satisfies the following two
requirements: (1) correctness: for any qualified set A[m], every secret s # SD, and
every random input r, the reconstruction succeeds; that is, C (A, D(s, r) |A)=s; and
(2) secrecy: for any unqualified set A[m] and secrets s1 , s2 # SD, the random
variables D(s1 , r) | A and D(s2 , r) | A are identically distributed (where the probabil-
ity is over the choice of r, distributed according to R). Finally, the share complexity
of S is the maximum total size of all shares in an m-tuple D(s, r), and its random-
ness complexity is the entropy of R.
Lemma 1. Let hM : [0, 1]m  [0, 1] be a monotone Boolean function. Let
h: [0, 1]n  [0, 1] be a Boolean function defined by h( y1 , ..., yn)=hM (g1 , ..., gm),
where each gi depends on a single variable yj ; that is, gi # [ y1 , y1 , ..., yn , yn ] for
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1im (such h will be referred to as a projection of hM). Let S be a generalized
secret sharing scheme with secret domain SD realizing the access structure hM , with
share complexity ; and randomness complexity #. Then, for any partition B1 , ..., Bk
among k players of the inputs to h, there exists a protocol P for disclosing a common
secret s # SD subject to the condition h, with communication complexity ; and shared
randomness complexity #.
Proof. Recall that the CDS protocol P involves players P1 , ..., Pk each holding
a portion of the input y= y1 , ..., yn (player Pj holds Bj) and the secret s # SD. The
players wish to reveal their secret to Carol subject to the condition h( y)=1. We show
how to construct P using the generalized secret sharing scheme S=(D, R, C)
realizing the access structure hM , where hM (g1 , ..., gm)=h( y1 , ..., yn).
The protocol P uses a shared random string r distributed according to R, and
proceeds as follows. First, each player Pj evaluates D(s, r), generating an m-tuple
of shares (s1 , ..., sm) (note that all players generate the same shares, since they use
the same secret and the same random input when evaluating D). Next, for each
i # [m], player Pj includes the share si in the message sent to Carol if and only if
the following two conditions hold: (1) gi is ‘‘owned’’ by Pj (i.e., gi is either yl or yl
for some l # Bj); and (2) gi evaluates to 1. That is, the message sent to Carol by the
player Pj consists of the restriction of the shares (s1 , ..., sm) to those which satisfy
the above two conditions.
Observe that since each input variable y l is held by some player, Carol receives
exactly those shares si for which gi=1. By this observation, if hM (g1 , ..., gm)=1
then Carol has exactly the si for which gi=1, which according to the definition of
generalized secret sharing is a qualified set of shares and can thus reconstruct the
secret s (using the reconstruction function C). On the other hand, if hM (g1 , ..., gm)
=0 then Carol receives an unqualified set of shares and hence gains no information
about s. To complete the proof, recall that hM (g1 , ..., gm)=h( y1 , ..., yn); thus, Carol
can reconstruct s whenever the condition h( y) holds and otherwise obtains no
information on s.
Finally, the shared randomness complexity of P is the same as the randomness
complexity of S, and the communication complexity of P is no larger than the
share complexity of S (since each share is sent by at most one player). K
We now use Lemma 1 to obtain an upper bound on the complexity of condi-
tional disclosure of secrets, depending on the size of a formula computing the
condition. The proof of the following theorem will use a known result about the
complexity of generalized secret sharing.
Fact 1 [5]. Suppose that hM : [0, 1]m  [0, 1] can be computed by a
monotone Boolean formula of size S. Then, there exists a generalized secret sharing
scheme realizing hM with SD=[0, 1], whose communication complexity and
shared randomness complexity are bounded by S.
Theorem 2. Suppose that h: [0, 1]n  [0, 1] can be computed by a Boolean
formula of size S, and let SD=[0, 1]. Then, for every partition B1 , ..., Bk of the
inputs to h,
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1. there exists a protocol P for disclosing a common secret bit s # SD (known
to all players) subject to the condition h, with communication complexity and shared
randomness complexity bounded by S.
2. there exists a protocol P$ for disclosing a secret bit s # SD (known to at least
one player) subject to the condition h, with communication complexity and shared
randomness complexity bounded by S+1.
Proof. A protocol P for conditional disclosure of a common secret bit s known
to all players is constructed as follows. Let H be a Boolean formula over the
variables y1 , ..., yn computing h, whose size is S. Replacing each negative literal y j
with a positive literal wj , we obtain a monotone Boolean formula HM of size S
computing a monotone function hM ( y1 , ..., yn , w1 , ..., wn). Note that h is a projec-
tion of hM , since h( y1 , ..., yn)=hM ( y1 , ..., yn , y 1 , ..., y n). Using Fact 1, it follows
from Lemma 1 that the players can disclose the bit s subject to the condition h
using at most S communication bits and at most S shared random bits, which
completes the proof of the first part of the theorem.
For the second part, a protocol P$ for conditional disclosure of a secret bit s
known to at least one player proceeds as follows. The players first conditionally dis-
close a shared random bit r0 , known to all of them, subject to the condition h. This
is done using the protocol P described above. Finally, a single player holding s
sends the bit sr0 to Carol. Clearly, if Carol can reconstruct r0 then she can also
reconstruct s, and if she obtains no information on r0 then she can obtain no
information on s, and the theorem follows. K
Remark 1. Using best known general upper bounds on the complexity of
generalized secret sharing [21], the result of Theorem 2 can be strengthened to
apply to any function h with a span program over GF(2) of size S (see [21] for a
definition of the span program model).
3.2.2. Direct Constructions for Special Cases
In the following, the conditional disclosure primitive will be used in our reduc-
tions for dealing with dishonest behavior of the user. These applications of condi-
tional disclosure require only a simple condition (e.g., testing equality between
inputs). Therefore, in the following we give direct constructions of conditional dis-
closure protocols realizing these specific conditions. These direct constructions are
more efficient than the ones obtained by a straightforward application of
Theorem 2. We stress though that the more general results described above are still
useful in other cryptographic scenarios, such as the one described in Subsection 6.3.
The next lemma shows an efficient implementation of conditional disclosure of
secrets, where the condition tests whether the sum of k field elements equals 0.
Later it will mostly be used with k=2, to implement conditional disclosure of
secrets where the condition tests for equality between two strings.
Lemma 2. Let F be a finite field (all arithmetic operations below are in this field).
Suppose that each of k players Pj holds an input yj # F and that a secret s # F is
known to at least one player. Then, there exists a protocol for disclosing the secret
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s subject to the condition kj=1 yj=0 in which each player sends a single field element
and whose shared random string consists of k random field elements.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that player Pk holds the secret s, and
let r0 , r1 , ..., rk&1 be independent random elements of F, shared by the parties. The
protocol can then proceed as follows:
v Each player Pj , 1 jk&1, sends to Carol the single field element
mj =
def yj r0+r j ;
v The player Pk sends to Carol mk =
def s+ ykr0&k&1j=1 rj .
First, note that if all inputs yj add up to 0, then s can be reconstructed as the sum
of all messages mj :
:
k
j=1
mj= :
k&1
j=1
( yj r0+r j)+s+ yk r0& :
k&1
j=1
rj=s+r0 :
k
j=1
yj=s.
We now show that if  yj {0, the k-tuple of messages (m1 , ..., mk) is uniformly dis-
tributed over F k independent of s. For any sequence of messages m1 , ..., mk # F k, we
define its support as the set of all choices r0 , r1 , ..., rk&1 which makes the players
send this sequence of messages to Carol (when the inputs are y1 , ..., yk and the
secret is s). By the construction of the protocol, the support consists of exactly all
r0 , r1 , ..., rk&1 satisfying the system of equations
y1r0+r1 =m1
y2r0 +r2 =m2
b
yk&1r0 +rk&1=mk&1
ykr0&r1 } } } &rk&1=mk&s.
This is a system of k linear equations in the k variables r0 , r1 , ..., rk&1 . When
 yj {0 the k equations are linearly independent, since adding the first k&1 equa-
tions to the last one yield a triangular system of equations. Therefore, any sequence
of messages m1 , ..., mk # F k has a support which is a singleton, and in particular all
sequences have the same size support. This implies that the uniform distribution of
the field elements r0 , r1 , ..., rk&1 induces a uniform distribution of the messages
m1 , ..., mk over F k, for any input tuple y1 , ..., yk with nonzero sum and any secret
s # F. K
Note that the above lemma outperforms the general construction of Theorem 2.
Using the general construction, the communication and randomness required for
disclosing a single bit secret is larger than the total size of k field elements (which
is a lower bound on the size of a formula evaluating the condition), whereas in the
specific construction of Lemma 2 communication and randomness of this size are
sufficient for the disclosure of a longer secret, namely a field element. The following
lemma shows that it is possible to further reduce the communication to be
dominated by the secret size, even when the secret is smaller than the inputs.
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Lemma 3. Suppose that each of k players holds an input string7 yj # [0, 1]l, and
a secret string s # [0, 1]m is known to at least one player. Then, there exists a
protocol for disclosing the secret s subject to the condition kj=1 yj=0
l in which
each player sends a string of length m and whose shared randomness complexity is
k } max(l, m).
Proof. For a finite field F=GF(2w), we use a standard representation of field
elements by w-bit strings such that each element of F is represented by the coef-
ficient vector of the polynomial associated with it. (Recall that an element of
GF(2w) may be identified with a polynomial over GF(2) of degree w&1, modulo
some irreducible degree-w polynomial). Such a representation defines an
isomorphism between the groups (F, +) and ([0, 1]w, ).
We now consider two possible cases. If lm, then the protocol from the proof
of Lemma 2 can be used as is, letting F=GF(2m) and associating the secret s with
the corresponding field element and each input string yj # [0, 1]l with the field
element corresponding to its m-bit padding yj0m&l.
In the second case (l>m), we use the same protocol with F=GF(2l), except
that each field element sent in the original protocol is projected to the m leftmost
bits of its representation; that is, if mj is the field element originally sent by Pj and
is represented by the string _1_2 } } } _l , then the message sent from Pj to Carol in
the new protocol would be the m-bit prefix _1_2 } } } _m . A key observation is that,
under the above representation, the projection operator commutes with the field
addition. Hence, the sum of all l-bit projections sent in the new protocol is equal
to the projection of kj=1 m j . It follows from the above observation and from the
analysis in the proof of Lemma 2 that if the condition kj=1 yj=0
l holds, then s
can be reconstructed as the exclusive-or of all messages. On the other hand, if the
condition does not hold, then the original k messages are uniformly and independ-
ently distributed over F, from which it follows that the projected m-bit messages are
independently and uniformly distributed over [0, 1]m. This proves the correctness
and secrecy of this protocol.
Finally, since in both cases each player sends a message string of length m, the
specified communication bound is met, and since in both cases the protocol of
Lemma 2 is invoked with F=GF(2max(l, m)), the specified shared randomness
bound is met as well. K
In particular, the result of Lemma 3 can be applied with k=2 for conditionally
disclosing a secret s subject to a condition which tests equality of strings held by
two players. This protocol clearly outperforms any protocol obtainable via the
general result of Theorem 2; indeed, since testing equality between l-bit strings
requires a formula of size 3(l), the best protocol obtainable via Theorem 2 would
require 3(l) communication bits for conditionally disclosing a single bit subject to
equality between two l-bit strings (compared to only two communication bits
required using Lemma 3). The improved efficiency obtained via Lemma 3 will be
used in the next subsection.
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7 The lemma is formulated for binary strings, but can be generalized to strings over any finite field.
3.3. A General Reduction with Respect to Dishonest Users
Using the conditional disclosure of secrets primitive described above, the follow-
ing theorem gives a general reduction from any PIR scheme to a SPIR scheme for
the case of any user (possibly dishonest).
Theorem 3. Let P be any 1-round k-database PIR scheme with communication
complexity (:k (n), ;k (n)). Then, there exists a 1-round, (k+1)-database SPIR
scheme S*P with communication complexity at most (:k (n)+(k+1) Wlog2 nX,
2;k (n)+1) and shared randomness complexity O(n+;k (n)).
Proof. Let SP be the protocol from the general (honest-user) reduction of
Theorem 1. By Claim 1, SP satisfies data privacy as long as the user sends to every
database DBj the same shift amount 2j . Thus we make S*P be the following
modification of SP , effectively forcing the user to send the same shifts.
The user’s queries are the same as in SP and so are the answers of DB0 (the
auxiliary database) and DB1 . In addition, for each 2 jk, we let DBj and DB1
disclose the original SP-answer of DBj subject to the condition 2j=21 (where 2j
is the Wlog2 nX-bit shift sent to DBj). This conditional disclosure is implemented
using Lemma 3.
The user privacy in the original SP is clearly maintained. The scheme S*P meets
the data-privacy requirement, since the use of conditional disclosure guarantees
that the (possibly dishonest) user will obtain information only on answers of
databases DBj such that 2j=21 , which by Claim 1 implies that the user learns at
most a single physical bit of data. Hence, S*P is indeed a SPIR scheme.
We now analyze the complexity of this scheme. For each 0 jk we let ; jk (n)
denote the length of the answer sent by DBj in the scheme SP . By Theorem 1, we
know that ;0k=1 and that 
k
j=0 ;
j
k (n)=;k (n)+1. Using Lemma 3, the com-
munication complexity required to implement the conditional disclosure sub-
protocol involving the databases DB1 and DBj in the scheme S*P is 2;
j
k (n). The
total communication sent from all databases to the user is therefore ;0k (n)+;
1
k (n)
+kj=2 (2;
j
k (n))1+2 
k
j=1 ;
j
k (n)=1+2;k (n). The total communication sent
from the user is the same as in SP , namely :k (n)+(k+1) Wlog2 nX. The shared
randomness complexity is the same as in SP plus the randomness required by
Lemma 3, which sums up to n+2 kj=2 max(2 Wlog2 nX, ;
j
k (n))=O(n+;k (n)). K
In subsequent sections we present SPIR schemes which rely on specific structural
properties of some underlying PIR schemes and exploit them to outperform the
above general transformations. In particular, they use sublinear shared randomness
and do not require an auxiliary database.
4. SPECIFIC SPIR SCHEMES WITH RESPECT TO HONEST USERS
In this section we construct honest-user SPIR schemes which perform as well as
their PIR counterparts, up to a multiplicative constant, both in terms of com-
munication and randomness. Our constructions utilize two primitives: private
simultaneous messages protocols (described below) and conditional disclosure of
secrets (introduced in Subsection 3.2 above). Since our schemes rely on specific PIR
608 GERTNER ET AL.
schemes from the literature, we first review some details of those PIR schemes
which are important for our constructions.
4.1. Some Known PIR Schemes
We start by describing a PIR scheme from [12], referred to as the basic cube
scheme. This scheme is the basis for the two-database scheme B2 from [12], also
described below, which in turn serves as the basis for the recursive k-database
scheme Bk from [1]. The schemes Bk and the polynomial interpolation scheme of
[12, 3] are described later on, in the proofs of Theorems 6 and 7, respectively.
Basic d-dimensional cube scheme. This is a PIR scheme for k=2d databases.
Assume without loss of generality that the database size is n=ld, where l is an
integer. The index set [n] can then be identified with the d-dimensional cube [l]d,
where each index i # [n] can be naturally identified with a d-tuple (i1 , ..., id).
A d-dimensional subcube is a subset S1_ } } } _Sd of the d-dimensional cube, where
each Sm is a subset of [l]. Such a subcube is denoted by the d-tuple C=(S1 , ...,
Sd). The k(=2d) databases are assigned all of the binary strings of length d, DB_
\_ # [0, 1]d. The scheme proceeds as follows.
Queries: The user picks a random subcube C=(S 01 , ..., S
0
d), where S
0
1 , ..., S
0
d
are independent random subsets of [l]. Let S 1m=S
0
m im (1md ), where
i=(i1 , ..., id) is the index that the user wishes to retrieve. For each _=_1 _2 } } } _d #
[0, 1]d, the user sends to database DB_ the subcube C_=(S _11 , ..., S
_d
d ), where each
set S _mm is represented by its characteristic l-bit string.
Answers: Each database DB_ , _ # [0, 1]d, computes the exclusive-or of the
data bits residing in the subcube C_ and sends the resultant bit b_ to the user.8
Reconstruction: The user computes xi as the exclusive-or of the k bits b_’s it
has received.
The scheme’s correctness follows from the fact that every bit in x except xi
appears in an even number of subcubes C_ , _ # [0, 1]d, while xi appears in exactly
one such subcube (see [12] for details). The communication complexity of this
2d-database scheme is O(n1d), much worse than the following scheme B2 and its
generalization Bk , which achieves communication O(n1(2k&1)) for a constant
number of databases k.
The scheme B2 . This scheme may be regarded as a two-database implementa-
tion of the basic eight-database (three-dimensional) cube scheme described above.
Let l=n13, and let i=(i1 , i2 , i3) be the index of the data bit being retrieved. Each
of the two databases DB000 and DB111 emulates the four databases DB_ ,
_ # [0, 1]3, such that the Hamming distance of _ from its own index is at most 1.
This is done in the following way. The user sends to DB000 the subcube C000=
(S 01 , S
0
2 , S
0
3) and to DB111 the subcube C111=(S
1
1 , S
1
2 , S
1
3) as in the basic cube
scheme. We would like the answers of each of the two databases to include the four
answer bits of the four databases it emulates. To this end, DB000 replies with its
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8 The exclusive-or of an empty set of bits is defined to be 0.
own answer bit b000 along with three l-bit long strings, each of which contains the
answer bit of one of the other databases it emulates. For instance, the i $1 th bit of
the string emulating DB100 is obtained by computing the exclusive-or of all data
bits residing in the subcube (S 01  i $1 , S
0
2 , S
0
3) implying that the i1th bit in this
string is equal to b100 . Symmetrically, DB111 sends the single bit b111 along with
three l-bit long strings, each of which corresponds to the subcubes obtained from
C111 by masking the set S 1m with all l possible values of im . Altogether, the user
receives eight answer strings a_ , _ # [0, 1]3, six of which contain l bits each, and
the other two (namely, a000 and a111) contain single bits. In each of the l-bit long
strings, the required answer bit b_ can be found in either the i1 bit of the string (for
_=100, 011), the i2 bit (for _=010, 101), or the i3 bit (for _=001, 110). Since the
user can locate all eight bits b_ , _ # [0, 1]3, in the answer strings, it can reconstruct
xi by computing their exclusive-or.
4.2. The Private Simultaneous Messages (PSM) Model
In a typical PIR scheme, the honest user can extract from the databases’ answers
more information than just the reconstructed value xi . Toward solving this
problem, we use the following idea. Consider any 1-round PIR scheme. In an execu-
tion of such a scheme, the user first produces k queries q1 , ..., qk , depending on the
index i. It then sends each query to the corresponding database and in response
receives k answer strings a1 , ..., ak . Finally, the user applies a reconstruction function
9 to obtain the desired bit xi . Our idea is to have the user compute the output of
9 without actually getting the answers a1 , ..., ak , from which it can obtain more
information, but rather get some other messages m1 , ..., mk that keep the privacy of
the string x.
Precisely this idea is captured by the model of noninteractive private computa-
tion introduced in [16] and further studied in [18], called the private simultaneous
messages (PSM ) model. In this model there are k players, each player Pj holding
a private input string yj , and an external referee called Carol. All players have
access to a shared random input, which is unknown to Carol. The goal of a PSM
protocol is to let Carol evaluate a function f ( y1 , ..., yk) without learning any addi-
tional information about the inputs y1 , ..., yk . The scenario of the PSM protocol is
similar to a conditional disclosure protocol (see Subsection 3.2), except that in
PSM there is no input to Carol, and there is no other input to the players except
y1 , ..., yk . More formally, in a PSM protocol each player Pj sends a single message
to Carol, based on its private input yj and the shared random input, and Carol
applies some reconstruction function to the k messages she received. A PSM
protocol computing a k-argument function f must satisfy the following require-
ments: (1) correctness: for any input tuple y=( y1 , ..., yk) and any shared random
input, the value reconstructed by Carol is f ( y); and (2) privacy: given any two
input tuples y=( y1 , ..., yk), y$=( y$1 , ..., y$k) such that f ( y)= f ( y$), the messages
viewed by Carol are identically distributed.
The communication complexity and the shared randomness complexity of a PSM
protocol are defined as in the conditional disclosure of secrets model. We denote
the communication complexity of a k-player PSM protocol by ck (m), where m is
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the total number of input bits held by the k players and its shared randomness
complexity by dk (m).
In [16, 18] several upper bounds on PSM complexity are obtained. In particular,
it is shown that any Boolean function with a branching program of size S(m) (with
any partition of the m input bits among k players) can be computed by a PSM
protocol whose communication complexity and shared randomness complexity are
O(k } S(m)2) [18]. In general, this quadratic overhead will turn out to be too
expensive for our purposes. However, some functions do admit simple PSM
protocols with linear complexity as we see in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Let (G, +, 0), (H, + , 0 ) be finite Abelian groups and f : G k  H be a
linear function (that is, f (( y1+z1), ..., ( yk+zk))= f ( y1 , ..., yk)+ f (z1 , ..., zk) for all
( y1 , ..., yk), (z1 , ..., zk) # Gk). Then, there exists a PSM protocol computing f whose
communication complexity and shared randomness complexity are no larger than m,
where m is the total number of input bits to f.
Proof. The PSM protocol for f proceeds as follows. Each player Pj masks its
input yj with rj , setting wj =
def yj+rj , where (r1 , ..., rk) # Gk is a random shared tuple
satisfying f (r1 , ..., rk)=0. Then, Pj sends the masked input wj to Carol. Carol can
now compute f (w1 , ..., wk)= f (( y1+r1), ..., ( yk+rk))= f ( y1 , ..., yk)+ f (r1 , ..., rk)
= f ( y1 , ..., yk)+ 0 = f ( y1 , ..., yk), which is the desired output value. The privacy of
this protocol follows by observing that for any input tuple y=( y1 , ..., yk) and
message tuple w=(w1 , ..., wk) such that f ( y)= f (w), there exists a unique random
input r (namely, r=w& y) such that f (r)=0 and the messages induced by the
inputs y and the random input r are w. Therefore, every message tuple w such that
f ( y)= f (w) has the same size support (a singleton), implying identical distribution
of all such messages. Finally, the communication and shared randomness com-
plexity are clearly as specified. K
This lemma is used in the following, when the groups G, H are the binary strings
of a fixed length, and the operation is  (exclusive-or).
Remark 2 (CDS from PSM). Note that the conditional disclosure of secrets
(CDS) primitive described in Subsection 3.2 and used in Theorem 2 may be
implemented (less efficiently) using PSM computation. Specifically, disclosing a bit
s subject to a condition g( y) may be reduced to the PSM computation of the func-
tion f ( y, s)= g( y) 7 s. Indeed, by the correctness of the PSM protocol for f, if
g( y)=1 then Carol can reconstruct s= g( y) 7 s. On the other hand, if g( y)=0
then, by the privacy of the PSM protocol, Carol’s view is identically distributed
under the inputs ( y, 0) and ( y, 1), implying that Carol learns nothing about s.
However, the general upper bound on the complexity of conditional disclosure of
secrets, established by Theorem 2, is linear in the size of a formula (or a span
program) computing the condition, whereas best known results on PSM com-
plexity yield a bound which is quadratic in such representation size. This is because
every function with formula size S(m) is also computable by a branching program
of size S(m)+1 (see [27, Chap. 14]). This, as mentioned above, gives a PSM
complexity of O(S(m)2).
611DATA PRIVACY IN PIR SCHEMES
4.3. SPIR Schemes Based on PSM and CDS Protocols
In this subsection we use PSM and CDS protocols to construct honest-user SPIR
schemes. First, in Lemma 5 we apply PSM solutions to a PIR scheme with a par-
ticular type of reconstruction function in order to get an honest-user SPIR scheme.
We then discuss the implications of this lemma and provide an example in which
it is used. This example and lemma are also helpful in our later constructions, in
particular ones which involve PIR schemes with a more general reconstruction
function.
Lemma 5. Suppose P is a 1-round k-database PIR scheme with communication
complexity (:k (n), ;k (n)), such that: (1) the reconstruction function 9 depends only
on the answers of the databases, and (2) the function 9 can be computed by a PSM
protocol whose communication complexity is ck (m) and whose shared randomness
complexity is dk (n). Then, there exists a 1-round k-database honest-user SPIR
scheme S whose communication complexity is (:k (n), ck (;k (n))) and whose shared
randomness complexity is dk (;k (n)).
Proof. A scheme S of the specified complexity can be obtained from P as
follows. The user chooses queries q1 , ..., qk as it does in the PIR scheme P and
sends each query qj to the corresponding database DBj . Each database DBj com-
putes its answer aj as it would do in P, but instead of sending the answer to the
user, the databases (using their shared randomness) simulate the PSM computation
of 9(a1 , ..., ak). That is, each database DBj sends to the user the message that
player Pj would send to Carol in the PSM protocol for 9. The correctness and
privacy of S follow from the correctness and privacy of P and of the PSM protocol
for 9, and the complexity is clearly as stated. K
We stress that Lemma 5 only yields honest-user SPIR schemes; indeed, a
dishonest user can potentially generate invalid queries, such that applying the
reconstruction function to their answers gives forbidden information which does
not follow from any physical data bit. (Here the idea of hiding the input to the
reconstruction function will not help, since the dishonest user may get information
from the output of the reconstruction function). A direct application of Lemma 5 is
given in the following example.
Example 1 (PSM-based honest-user SPIR scheme for the d-dimensional cube
scheme). Consider the basic d-dimensional cube scheme from Subsection 4.1, in
which the reconstruction function consists of computing the exclusive-or of the k
answer bits sent from the databases. This scheme does not maintain data privacy,
since the user learns the exclusive-or of k=2d different subsets of data bits. In this
case, the extra information can be eliminated by applying Lemmas 4 and 5. Specifi-
cally, instead of sending the original answer b_ , each database DB_ will send a
masked answer b_ r_ , where r=r0 } } } 00r0 } } } 01 } } } r1 } } } 10 is a (k&1)-bit shared ran-
dom string, and r1 } } } 11 is computed as the exclusive-or of the bits of r. Under the
modified scheme, an honest user’s view is uniformly distributed among all k-tuples
whose exclusive-or is _ # [0, 1]d b_ , which by the scheme’s correctness is equal to
the physical bit xi .
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Other PIR schemes with linear reconstruction function, to which Lemma 5 is
applicable with no communication overhead, include the polynomial-interpolation
schemes for O(log n) databases of [12, 3], for which (dishonest-user) SPIR
counterparts will be given in Subsection 5.2.
Remark 3 (On the generality of Lemma 5). Note that Lemma 5 requires that in
the underlying PIR scheme P, the reconstruction function depends only on the
answers computed by the databases. While this is the case with the basic cube
scheme (see Example 1 above), this is not the case with the scheme B2 , for instance,
where reconstruction heavily depends on the index i held by the user. In order to
satisfy this requirement, any PIR scheme P, whose reconstruction function 9 may
also depend on the the index i and the queries qj , may be augmented into a PIR
scheme P$, whose reconstruction 9$ depends only on the answers, as follows. First,
the user secret-shares the index i between two databases independent of its original
queries (e.g., by sending a Wlog2 nX-bit random string to one database and the
exclusive-or of this random string with the binary representation of i to the other
database). Such a sharing of i does not violate the user’s privacy and introduces
only a minor overhead on the query complexity. Then, each database DBj appends
to its original answer aj the query qj it received (including the share of i ). The
original reconstruction function 9 induces a reconstruction function 9$ for the
augmented scheme P$, which depends on the databases’ answers alone. Hence,
Lemma 5 can be applied to the augmented scheme. However, the complexity of this
solution can be prohibitive.
In the remainder of this section we derive an honest-user SPIR scheme from the
two-database PIR scheme B2 .
9 In this case, it is possible to use the PSM methodol-
ogy of Lemma 5 and Remark 3 to efficiently meet this goal. However, towards con-
structions in the next sections, we introduce an alternative, conceptually simpler,
methodology of using conditional disclosure of secrets on top of PSM. A similar
methodology may also be useful in different contexts, as will be demonstrated in
Subsection 6.3.
Theorem 4. There exists a two-database honest-user SPIR scheme, B$2 , with
communication complexity and shared randomness complexity O(n13).
Proof. Recall the PIR scheme B2 (see Section 4.1) and, in particular, its
reconstruction function which may be viewed as a two-stage procedure: (1) the user
selects a single bit from each of eight answer strings, depending only on the index
i=(i1 , i2 , i3); and (2) the user takes the exclusive-or of the eight bits it has selected
to obtain xi . Thus, if we let the honest user learn only the exclusive-or of the eight
bits corresponding to i, the data-privacy requirement will be met. This can be
achieved by using the conditional disclosure of secrets primitive on top of a PSM
protocol computing the exclusive-or of eight bits. The scheme B$2 , an honest-user
SPIR version of B2 , proceeds as follows:
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9 While it is possible to extend our construction to apply to Bk , the k-database generalization from
[1], we postpone this generalization to the next section, which deals with the case of a dishonest user.
Queries: The user sends the subcubes C000 to DB000 and C111 to DB111 , as in
the scheme B2 . In addition, the user independently shares the three characteristic
vectors /im , m=1, 2, 3, among the two databases. This is done by picking random
l-bit strings i 0m , i
1
m such that i
0
m i
1
m=/im and sending the three strings i
0
m to DB000
and the three strings i 1m to DB111 .
10
Answers: Each of the two databases computes three answer strings of length
n13 and one 1-bit answer as in the B2 scheme. Denote by a_ the answer string
emulating DB_ , _ # [0, 1]3. The databases treat each bit of a string a_ as an input
to a PSM protocol computing the exclusive-or of eight bits and using their shared
randomness they compute (but do not send) the PSM message sent for each such
bit. Under the simple PSM protocol for XOR (see Lemma 4 or Example 1), each
such message is by itself a single bit. Let w_ denote the string obtained by replacing
each bit from a_ by its corresponding PSM message bit. In this case, w_ is obtained
by masking every bit of a_ with the same random bit r_ , where the bits [r_] are
eight random bits whose exclusive-or is 0. Finally, for every _ # [0, 1]3 and
1 j|w_ |, the databases use their shared randomness to disclose to the user the
jth bit of w_ , (w_) j , subject to an appropriate condition. For _=100, 011 the con-
dition is (i 01) j  (i 11) j=1, for _=010, 101 it is (i 02) j  (i 12) j=1, and for _=001, 110
it is (i 03) j  (i
1
3) j=1. The single bits w000 , w111 can be sent in a plain form.
Reconstruction: The user reconstructs the eight PSM message bits corre-
sponding to the index i (using the reconstruction function of the conditional dis-
closure protocol) and computes their exclusive-or to obtain xi .
The correctness of the above scheme and the user’s privacy follow from the
correctness and user’s privacy of the PIR scheme B2 and the correctness of the CDS
and the PSM schemes used and are easy to verify. We turn to show that the scheme
meets the data-privacy requirement with respect to an honest user. We first intro-
duce some notation. By A(x, i, r, \) we denote the 8-tuple of B2 -answers a_ , com-
puted by the databases in the execution of B$2 (or B2) induced by (x, i, r, \), where
x is the data string, i is the user’s input query, r is the shared randomness of the
databases, and \ is the random input of the user. Similarly, by W(x, i, r, \)
we denote the 8-tuple of PSM strings w_ , computed by the databases in the
corresponding execution of B$2 . Finally, given an 8-tuple w=(w_)_ # [0, 1]3 and an
index i, we let w | i denote the restriction of w to the eight bits corresponding to the
index i.
Since the user is honest and by the correctness of B2 , the exclusive-or of the eight
bits in A(x, i, r, \) | i is equal to xi . Thus, by the privacy of the PSM protocol for
XOR, it follows that for any x, x$, i such that xi=x$i , any \ and z # [0, 1]8,
Prr[W(x, i, r, \) | i=z]=Prr [W(x$, i, r, \) | i=z]. (1)
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10 When the user is honest, this extra sharing of /im is redundant since the characteristic vectors of the
sets S 0m , S
1
m sent by the user may be viewed as these shares; however, this presentation more closely
resembles the solution for a dishonest user, described in the the next section.
By the secrecy of the conditional disclosure protocol and the independence of its
shared randomness from the PSM randomness, it follows that for any x, x$, i, \, v,
and z # [0, 1]8 we have:
Prr[viewU (x, i, r, \)=v | W(x, i, r, \) | i=z]
=Prr [viewU (x$, i, r, \)=v | W(x$, i, r, \) | i=z]. (2)
Finally, combining Eqs. (1) and (2) we get that for any x, x$, i, \, v such that
xi=x$i ,
Prr [viewU (x, i, r, \)=v]
= :
z # [0, 1]8
Prr[viewU (x, i, r, \)=v | W(x, i, r, \) | i=z]
_Prr [W(x, i, r, \) | i=z]
= :
z # [0, 1]8
Prr[viewU (x$, i, r, \)=v | W(x$, i, r, \) | i=z]
_Prr [W(x$, i, r, \) | i=z]
=Prr [viewU (x$, i, r, \)=v], (3)
concluding the proof of the data-privacy property. (We note that while the above
proof explicitly refers to all relevant random variables, in subsequent proofs of a
similar nature such detailed analysis will be replaced by higher level arguments).
It remains to show that the scheme meets the specified complexity bounds. Since
the condition for disclosing each of the O(n13) bits of the strings wj is of the form
y1 y2=1 (or equivalently y1 y2=0), where y1 , y2 are single bits, it follows
from Lemma 3 (or Theorem 2) that all such masked answer bits can be condi-
tionally disclosed with total communication and shared randomness cost of O(n13)
bits. Altogether, the communication complexity of the scheme and its shared
randomness complexity are O(n13), as required. K
5. SPECIFIC SPIR SCHEMES WITH RESPECT TO DISHONEST USERS
In the previous section we were concerned with an honest but curious user. In
this section we construct SPIR schemes which guarantee data privacy with respect
to dishonest users as well. The following example demonstrates the extra informa-
tion that a dishonest user may obtain in ordinary PIR schemes and in the honest-
user SPIR scheme constructed above.
Example 2. Consider the scheme B2 . Suppose that a user sends the subcube
C000=([i1] , [i2] , [i3]) as a (legitimate) query to the first database. Then, the
answers of this database alone, which include the bits x(i1 , i2 , i3) , x (i1 , i2 , i3) x( j, i2 , i3) ,
x(i1 , i2 , i3) x(i1 , j, i3) , and x(i1 , i2 , i3) x(i1 , i2 , j ) for all j # [n
13], reveal about 3n13 physical
bits of data. Note that by randomly setting this query an honest user can also learn
that number of physical data bits, but this occurs with only an exponentially small
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probability. Moreover, even in the scheme B$2 (which perfectly maintains data
privacy for an honest user), a dishonest user may similarly obtain 3(n13) physical
data bits. To do this, the user sends to the first database the same cube C000 as
above and sends to the second database the empty cube C111=(<, <, <). Instead
of sharing the characteristic vectors /im , the user will now share three all-ones vec-
tors, which would automatically satisfy all disclosure conditions and allow the user
to learn the entirety of the eight strings w_ . Then, about 3n13 physical bits can be
reconstructed from the combined answers of the two databases. For instance, for
every j # [n13] the user may reconstruct the bit x( j, i2 , i3) by computing w000 
(w100) j  (w010) i2  (w001) i3  (w011)1  (w101)1  (w011)1 w111 .
Observe that in the honest-user SPIR scheme B$2 , a dishonest user can cheat in
two ways. One way is to improperly share the characteristic vector of its index (e.g.,
share the all-ones vector instead). The other way is to send invalid B2-queries. This
may give the user extra information even when the index is properly shared,
because invalid B2 -queries can make the output of the reconstruction function
depend on more than one bit of data. In order to become resilient to dishonest
users, any honest-user SPIR scheme can (in principle) be modified to filter every
original answer bit using the conditional disclosure primitive, such that the condi-
tion tests for the validity of the user’s queries. However, the complexity of disclosing
each answer bit subject to a full validity test will be prohibitive. In the next subsec-
tions we use alternative means to transform the best known PIR schemes into SPIR
schemes. All these transformations involve at most a constant multiplicative com-
munication overhead.
5.1. Cube Schemes
In this subsection we construct, for any constant k2, a k-database SPIR
scheme whose communication complexity is O(n1(2k&1)) (as of the best known
k-database PIR scheme). We first address the two-database case, from which we
then generalize to a k-database scheme.
Theorem 5. There exists a 2-database SPIR scheme, B"2 , with communication
complexity and shared randomness complexity O(n13).
Proof. Assume that l=n13 is an integer. The scheme B"2 proceeds as follows:
Queries: The user sends to DB000 the subcube C000=(S 01 , S
0
2 , S
0
3) and to DB111
the subcube C111=(S 11 , S
1
2 , S
1
3), as in the scheme B2 . In addition, the user inde-
pendently shares dense representations of the index components im , m=1, 2, 3 (as
opposed to the unary representation in the scheme B$2). This is done by viewing
each index component im as an element of Zl , picking random Wlog2 lX-bit
elements i 0m , i
1
m # Zl such that i
0
m+i
1
m#im (mod l) and sending the three strings i
0
m
to DB000 and the three strings i 1m to DB111 .
Answers: The answers in B"2 are constructed on top of some intermediate com-
putations from the scheme B$2 . Recall that b_ denotes the answer from database
DB_ in the basic three-dimensional cube scheme, a_ denotes the answer string
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corresponding to DB_ in the original scheme B2 , and w_ denotes the strings con-
structed by taking the exclusive-or of each bit in the string a_ with the same ran-
dom bit r_ (these correspond to messages in a PSM protocol for computing XOR).
Let t1 , t2 , t3 be shared random strings of length l each, and u1 , u2 , u3 be shared
random bits (these will be used as masks to guarantee that the user gets no infor-
mation on x if the subcubes it sent are not consistent with the index whose binary
representation was shared). The databases reply with the following messages:
1. DB000 sends to the user the three bits v0m =
def (/S0m , tm) um , m=1, 2, 3,
where ( } , } ) denotes inner product over GF(2). Similarly, DB111 sends the bits
v1m =
def (/S 1m , tm) um .
2. DB000 sends to the user the bit w000 . Similarly, DB111 sends the bit w111 .
3. DB000 , DB111 use the SPIR scheme S2* of Corollary 1 to provide the
user with a single bit from each of the six l-bit strings w100 , w010 , w001 (known to
DB000), and w011  t1 , w101 t2 , w110 t3 (known to DB111),11 in the positions
corresponding to the shared index. This is done by using the user’s queries i 0m , i
1
m
as the queries for the scheme S2* , where m=1 for retrieval from w100 and
w011  t1 , m=2 for retrieval from w010 and w101  t2 , and m=3 for retrieval from
w001 and w110  t3 . Since the index retrieved in the scheme S2* is the sum of the
queries to both databases, this means that the user obtains the bits in position i1
from the first pair of strings, i2 from the second pair, and i3 from the third.
Reconstruction: An honest user reconstruct xi as follows. For m=1, 2, 3 the
user reconstructs the bit (tm) im by computing v
0
mv
1
m . Then, using these three bits
and the bits obtained from the S2* invocations, it computes
(t1) i1  (t2) i2  (t3) i3 w000 w111  (w011) i1  (w101) i2  (w110) i3
 (w100  t1) i1  (w010 t2) i2  (w001  t3) i3
= 
_ # [0, 1]3
b_=xi .
The correctness and the user’s privacy in this scheme are easy to verify. We now
show the scheme’s data privacy, relative to any user.
Lemma 6. Denote by S bm , i
b
m , b=0, 1, m=1, 2, 3, queries sent by a possibly
dishonest user, and let i*m =
def i 0m+i
1
m (mod l). If these queries satisfy S
0
mS 1m=[i*m]
for m=1, 2, 3 then the answers reveal the bit x(i 1*, i2*, i 3*) and no other information about
the data. Otherwise, the answers reveal no information about the data.
Proof. First, observe that using the random bits um guarantees that for
m=1, 2, 3 the answers v0m , v
1
m are two uniformly distributed bits satisfying
v0mv
1
m=(/S0mS1m , tm). Thus if the user is honest then S
0
mS
1
m=[i*m] and so the
user can obtain (tm) i*m , but if S
0
mS
1
m{[i*m] then the messages (v
0
m , v
1
m),
m=1, 2, 3, jointly give no information about (tm) i*m . (Note that in the latter case a
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11 Recall that in S2* only one of the two databases needs to know the data, and the other one only
needs access to the shared random string.
user may learn the exclusive-or of the bit (tm)i*m with other bits in tm , but this still
gives no information on (tm) i*m .)
Next, observe that the data privacy of the SPIR scheme S2* guarantees that the
user learns a single physical bit from each of the six l-bit strings to which the
scheme was applied. Moreover, the position of this bit corresponds to a shared
index component i*m . By the properties of the underlying PSM protocol, the only
information revealed by these bits is their exclusive-or which is
\ _ # [0, 1]3 b_+ (t1) i*1  (t2) i*2  (t3) i*3 . (3)
Altogether, the only information on x the user can obtain is what follows from
(/S 0mS 1m , tm) and the outcome of expression (3) above. Now, if S
0
mS 1m=[i*m]
for m=1, 2, 3 then _ # [0, 1]3 b_=x(i*1 , i*2 , i*3 ) , implying that xi*1 , i*2 , i*3 is the only infor-
mation on x learned by the user. On the other hand, if S 0mS 1m{[i*m] for some
m, then there exists some m for which the user gets no information about (tm) i*m ,
and thus it learns no information about the data. K
Finally, using Corollary 1 the S2* invocations can be implemented with a total
of O(l) communication complexity and shared randomness complexity. Thus, the
scheme meets the specified complexity bounds. K
We note that the SPIR scheme B"2 constructed above is in fact as communication
efficient as the PIR scheme B2 up to an additive logarithmic overhead.
Next, we give a k-database generalization of Theorem 5.
Theorem 6. For every constant k2 there exists a k-database SPIR scheme,
B"k , with communication complexity and shared randomness complexity O(n1(2k&1)).
Proof. We start by giving a short description of the PIR scheme Bk from [1].
Let d=2k&1 and l=n1d. In the scheme Bk , the k databases (denoted
DB1 , ..., DBk) jointly emulate the 2
d databases of the d-dimensional cube scheme.
The scheme proceeds as follows. The user sends to DB1 the subcube C0d as in the
basic cube scheme and sends to each of DB2 , ..., DBk the subcube C1d . In its
answers, DB1 emulates all databases DB_ of the original scheme such that
_ # [0, 1]d is at Hamming distance at most 1 from 0d, similar to the way such an
emulation is done in the scheme B2 . Simultaneously, the remaining databases
DB2 , ..., DBk jointly emulate the remaining databases of the original scheme,
namely all DB_ such that _ contains at least two 1s. This is done using a constant
number (2d&d&1) of recursive invocations of the scheme Bk&1 between the user
and DB2 , ..., DBk . In each such invocation the user retrieves a single bit b_ from
a virtual data string, whose entries correspond to the different subcubes possibly
sent to DB_ in the basic cube scheme (i.e., each bit of the virtual data strings is the
exclusive-or of data bits residing in such a potential subcube). By taking the
exclusive-or of the d+1 bits selected from the answers of DB1 together with the
2d&d&1 bits retrieved by the recursive invocations of Bk&1 , the user reconstructs xi .
We now show how to adapt the proof of Theorem 5 to this k-database
generalization. Intuitively, we combine the recursive construction outlined above
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with the techniques used for constructing the scheme B"2 (of Theorem 5). Note that
in B"2 each of the two databases had a role as a main database having some infor-
mation to send to the user, as well as an auxiliary database to help the other
database disclose its own information without revealing any extra information.
Similarly in B"k we will have DB1 be the main database in emulating the databases
DB_ of Hamming distance at most 1 from 0
d in the original cube scheme and DB2
be the auxiliary database for this purpose. In addition, DB2 , ..., DBk will recursively
emulate the other databases of the original cube scheme, as in the scheme Bk
described above. We start by describing the induction assumption we will be using,
followed by a description of the scheme.
Suppose we have a (k&1)-database SPIR scheme B"k&1 of communication com-
plexity and shared randomness complexity O(n1(2k&3)). In this case we make an
additional assumption on B"k&1 : we assume that the user is required to commit to
the index being retrieved. This assumption is made precise in the following way. We
say that a 1-round PIR scheme P satisfies the strong data-privacy requirement with
parameter d $, if the following conditions hold:
1. On a data string x of length n$=ld $, the user sends special queries
Q0m , Q
1
m , 1md $ (each of which is an element of Zl); and
2. If a user (possibly a dishonest user) sends queries in which Q0m+Q
1
m#i*m
(mod l) for each 1md $, then the answers reveal at most the bit x(i*1 , ..., i*d $) .
Note that strong data privacy implies the usual data privacy. Also note that the
scheme B"2 satisfies this stronger requirement with d $=3, as follows from Lemma 6.
Our additional assumption on B"k&1 (which will be carried on to B"k) is that it
satisfies the strong data privacy requirement with d $=2(k&1)&1=2k&3.
The scheme B"k proceeds as follows:
Queries: The user sends to DB1 the subcube C0d=(S 01 , ..., S
0
d) and to each of
DB2 , ..., DBk the subcube C1d=(S 11 , ..., S
1
d). In addition, the user independently
shares dense representations of the index components im , m=1, 2, ..., d, between
DB1 and DB2 , using additive shares over Zl as in the scheme B"2 . Finally, the user
sends the queries necessary for the recursive invocations of B"k&1 described in item
4 below.
Answers: As before, let w_ denote the strings corresponding to the PSM
message strings for emulating database DB_ in the d-dimensional cube scheme. For
_ such that weight(_)2 these strings are described below, whereas for _ of weight
0 or 1 these can be constructed from the query C0 d exactly as before. In particular,
we consider wem where em denotes the mth unit vector of length d (note that the
databases whose index is in Hamming distance at most 1 from 0d are DB0d and
DBem 1md, and they can be emulated by DB0d as before). Let t1 , t2 , ..., td be
shared random strings of length l and u1 , u2 , ..., ud be shared random bits. The
databases reply with the following messages:
1. DB1 sends to the user the d bits v0m =
def (/S0m , tm) um , 1md.
Similarly, DB2 sends the bits v1m =
def (/S1m , tm) um .
2. DB1 sends the bit w0d s, where s is a shared random bit (to be condi-
tionally disclosed in item 5 below).
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3. DB1 computes all l-bit long PSM message strings wem , 1md,
emulating databases DBem in the d-dimensional cube scheme. Then DB1 and DB2
use the SPIR scheme S2* to provide the user with the bit in position im of each
string wem tm . Like in the scheme B"2 , this is done by using the shares of im as the
queries in S2*.
4. For each _ # [0, 1]d such that weight(_)2, the user and the databases
DB2 , DB3 , ..., DBk recursively invoke B"k&1 on the virtual data string w_ defined
in the following. Let d $=d&2 and n$=ld $. Let m_z , 1zweight(_), denote the
position of the z th zero in _. With every _ such that weight(_)2 and tuple
i $=(i $1 , ..., i $d $) # [l]d $ we associate a subcube C _i $ (of the cube [l]
d), which is
obtained from C1d by replacing each set S 1z , 1zweight(_), with the set S
1
z  imz_ .
Each w_ is defined to be the n$-bit string, whose i $ th bit is equal to the exclusive-or
of data bits residing in the subcube C _i $ together with the PSM random bit r_ . In
a recursive invocation of B"k&1 on the virtual data string w_ , the user retrieves the
bit whose index is represented by the d $-tuple i $_=(im1_ , im2_ , ..., imp_ , 1, ..., 1), where
p=weight(_).
5. The databases conditionally disclose the shared bit s subject to a con-
junction of the following conditions:
(a) For every 3 jk, the subcube sent to DBj is equal to the subcube
sent to DB2 .
(b) For every _ # [0, 1]d such that weight(_)2, the index i $ shared by
the user in the invocation of B"k&1 on w_ (in accordance with the strong data-
privacy assumption made on B"k&1) is equal to i $_ . This can be verified by compar-
ing each component of i $ with the corresponding component of i as shared by the
user.
(For efficiently disclosing s under the conjunction of all these conditions, the
databases may write s as the exclusive-or of several independent random bits and
disclose each of these bits subject to a single condition of equality between two
strings).
Reconstruction: The user reconstructs xi by recursively reconstructing the bits
retrieved via B"k&1 and taking their exclusive-or with all other bits disclosed to the
user.
We start by analyzing the communication and shared randomness complexity.
By Lemma 3 and Corollary 1, the conditional disclosure of the bit s and the SPIR
retrievals from the strings wem  tm can be implemented with O(l) communication
and shared randomness complexity, for a constant k. Thus, by induction (using B"2
as basis) the communication complexity is ck (n)=O(l)+(2d&d&1) } ck&1(ld&2)
=O(l)=O(n1(2k&1)), and similarly the shared randomness complexity is also
O(n(1(2k&1)).
The correctness and the user’s privacy can be easily verified. It remains to show
that the strong data-privacy requirement also holds for B"k . We argue that if the
user commits to an index i=(i1 , ..., id) (by sharing its components between DB1
and DB2), then it can learn at most the bit xi . As in the B"2 scheme, an honest user
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learns xi alone. In order to learn some information involving other bits, a dishonest
user must deviate from the scheme’s specification either by sending to DB1 , ..., DBk
subcubes which do not meet the requirements imposed by i or by trying to retrieve
from the recursive invocations of B"k&1 different bits than those corresponding to
i. The specified disclosure conditions, the data privacy of S2* , and the strong data-
privacy assumption made on B"k&1 guarantee that in both of these cases, the user
will learn no information at all. K
5.2. A Polynomial Interpolation Based Scheme
In this section we prove that the polynomial interpolation based PIR scheme for
k=Wlog2 n+1X databases from [12] (see also [3]) can be transformed into a
SPIR scheme with the same number of databases and a constant factor of com-
munication and randomness overhead.
Theorem 7. There exists a Wlog2 n+1X-database SPIR scheme, with com-
munication complexity and shared randomness complexity O(log2 n } log log n).
Proof. We start by describing the underlying PIR scheme, which is based on the
method of low-degree polynomial interpolation (see [3, 12] for more details).
Assume without loss of generality that n=2s, where s is a positive integer, and let
k=s+1 be the number of databases. Let GF(q) be a finite field with at least k+1
elements and :j , 1 jk, be distinct, nonzero elements of GF(q). With every index
i # [n] we associate an s-tuple @ =(i1 , i2 , ..., is) # [0, 1]s, corresponding to the binary
representation of i. For each data string x # [0, 1]n, let px( y1 , ..., ys) denote a multi-
variate degree-s polynomial such that px(@ )=xi for every i # [n] (such px may be
taken to be the multilinear extension of the function f (@ ) =def x i). The user picks a
random s-tuple c =(c1 , ..., cs) # GF(q)s, and sends to each database DBj , 1 jk,
the query u j=: j } c +@ . Each database DBj replies with a single field element
aj =
def px(u j). The user reconstructs x i by interpolation: if p$ is the unique degree-s
univariate polynomial (over GF(q)) such that p$(:j)=aj for every 1 jk, then
xi= p$(0). The communication complexity of this scheme is O(log2 n log log n).
As noted in Subsection 4.3, the linearity of the reconstruction function (interpola-
tion) allows us to obtain a PSM-based honest-user SPIR scheme with the same
communication complexity. To prevent a dishonest user from obtaining any
illegitimate information on x, we require the user to prove that its queries are con-
sistent with some @ # [0, 1]s and c # GF(q)s. Such a proof will consist of sharing
each entry of c and @ , and its validation will consist of verifying that @ # [0, 1]s and
that u j=:j } c +@ for each 1 jk.
We begin with the following observation, which also yields a slight improvement
to the original PIR scheme described above. Note that the user reconstructs xi by
computing some fixed linear combination over GF(q) of the k field elements replied
by the databases. Thus, as a first step, we can let each database multiply its original
answer by the corresponding coefficient, so that reconstruction will consist of com-
puting the sum of all answers over GF(q). Then, if q is chosen to be a power of 2
(q=2Wlog2(k+1)X suffices), it is enough for the databases to reply only with the least
significant bit of each answer and for the user to reconstruct xi by taking the
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exclusive-or of the k answer bits. From now on we refer to this modified scheme.
The corresponding SPIR scheme we construct is formally described as follows:
Queries: The user sends to each database DBj a query u j as in the original
scheme. In addition, the user picks random tuples @ 0, @ 1, c 0, c 1 # GF(q)s such that
@ 0+@ 1=@ and c 0+c 1=c and sends @ 0, c 0 to DB1 and @ 1, c 1 to each of
DB2 , ..., DBk .
Answers: Let r1 , r2 , ..., rk be independent random bits (included in the
databases’ shared randomness), and let r denote their exclusive-or. Each database
DBj replies with a$j =
def aj rj , where aj is its answer according to the modified
scheme. In addition, the databases use their shared randomness to disclose the bit
r, subject to a conjunction of the following conditions: (1) for every 3 jk, the
shares of @ and c sent to DBj are identical to those sent to DB2 ; (2) for every
1ms, either i 0m+i
1
m=0 or i
0
m+i
1
m=1 (where i
b
m denotes the m th entry of the
bth share of @ ); and finally (3) for every 1 jk and 1ms, :j (c0m+c
1
m)+
(i 0m+i
1
m)=u
j
m . Note that the above condition may be expressed by a Boolean for-
mula over O(ks)=O(log log n) atomic conditions, each testing equality between
two elements of GF(q) known to two different databases. For instance, if j>1 then
verifying the condition :j (c0m+c
1
m)+(i
0
m+i
1
m)=u
j
m is equivalent to comparing : jc
0
m
+i 0m , which is known to DB1 , and u
j
m&:jc
1
m&i
1
m , which is known to DBj . Using
Theorem 2, the conditional disclosure of r can be implemented with communication
complexity and shared randomness complexity of O(log2 n } log log n).
Reconstruction: The user reconstructs r and computes xi as the exclusive-or of
a$1 , ..., a$k and r.
The correctness and the user’s privacy of the original scheme are clearly main-
tained. To see the data privacy of this scheme, consider two possible cases. If the
user’s queries are valid, then the tuple (a$1 , a$2 , ..., a$k , r) is uniformly distributed
among all (k+1)-tuples over GF(2) which add up to x i , implying that the answer
distribution depends only on xi . Otherwise, the user obtains no information on r,
and consequently a$1 , ..., a$k (which are uniformly and independently distributed over
GF(2)) are independent of the conditional disclosure messages. It follows that in
the latter case the user obtains no information on x.
Excluding the conditional disclosure of r, the communication complexity of the
scheme is dominated by the query complexity, which is O(log2 n } log log n).
Together with the complexity of disclosing r, which is discussed above, the entire
scheme requires O(log2 n } log log n) communication and shared randomness
bits. K
6. CONCLUSION AND EXTENSIONS
We have presented a methodology which allows the implementation of com-
munication efficient SPIR schemes, requiring only one round of interaction and
withstanding any dishonest behavior of the user. This methodology may be useful
for dealing with other variants of the basic PIR question, as we demonstrate in this
section, as well as in other cryptographic scenarios. In the following we show how
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to extend our results in two directions: dealing with retrieval of blocks instead of
single-bit records and dealing with t-privacy, namely privacy against coalitions of
up to t colluding databases. We also present an application which, using our
methodology for SPIR and in particular the conditional disclosure of secrets
primitive, can be implemented quite efficiently. This application, termed private
retrieval with costs, allows a user to privately retrieve (in a single round) any collec-
tion of data items, provided that their total cost does not exceed what it had
previously paid for.
6.1. Block Retrieval SPIR Schemes
So far, we have restricted our attention to retrieval of single bits rather than
multi-bit records, also referred to as blocks. In this subsection we show how results
from the previous sections can be extended to yield block-retrieval SPIR schemes.
We start by observing that for PIR schemes generality is not lost when only
single bit retrieval is considered: any PIR scheme for single bit retrieval may simply
be invoked l times in parallel to retrieve a block of l bits. However this argument
does not carry on to SPIR schemes, because a cheating user may invoke the scheme
on l bits which do not belong to the same record, thus obtaining information about
more than one physical block. Therefore, we describe a modification of the above
procedure which works for single round SPIR schemes.
Given a single round SPIR scheme where the user can retrieve a single bit out
of the n-bit data string, one can construct a (single round) SPIR scheme to retrieve
an l-bit record from a data string of n such records as follows: the user sends
queries as in the original bit-retrieval scheme, and the databases reply l times to the
user’s queries, once for each bit of the record. Each such reply allows the user to
learn a single bit of the selected record, and since the user generates queries only
once it is guaranteed that the l bits that it learns indeed form a single record of the
database.
The above transformation from single-bit to multi-bit retrieval is not applicable
for multi-round SPIR schemes, since the same set of queries cannot be used multi-
ple times for different record bits (queries for each bit must depend on replies
received in previous rounds). On the other hand, for multi-round schemes, our
general PIR to SPIR transformation of Section 3 may be extended to work for
multi-bit block retrieval, by letting each entry of the shared random string r consist
of l bits instead of a single bit. The protocols and their proofs can be modified in
a straightforward way to support this extension. In addition, note that all our
specific SPIR schemes (Sections 4, 5) are single round and thus may be used for
block retrieval by the above transformation. This is also true for our general SPIR
scheme (Section 3), when used with an underlying single round PIR scheme (which
is the case for most PIR schemes known in the literature).
6.2. t-Private SPIR Schemes
In the general reduction described in Section 3, even if the original PIR scheme
P is t-private for some t>1, the resultant SPIR scheme SP will still only be
1-private. This is because if DB0 colludes with any other database DBj , the joint
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view of these two colluding databases includes both the shift 2 and the shifted index
i $=(i&2) mod n, from which the user’s index i can easily be recovered. Generaliz-
ing the construction of SP , a t-private SPIR scheme S tP can be obtained from any
t-private PIR scheme P as follows. Instead of directly asking DB0 for the (i&2)th
bit of the shared random string r, the user can retrieve this bit by recursively invok-
ing the (t&1)-private SPIR scheme S t&1P with a fresh set of databases. As a basis
S0P for this recursion, we may take the trivial 1-database scheme in which the user
explicitly asks for the desired index. In particular, the (k+1)-database 1-private
scheme described in Section 3 may be viewed as the second level of the recursion.
In general, for any t-private k-database PIR scheme P, applying this recursion
yields a t-private (kt+1)-database SPIR scheme SP whose communication com-
plexity is roughly t times that of our original (1-private) scheme.
In the following generalization of Theorem 3 we show that the number of
databases in the t-private SPIR scheme can be reduced to k+t, at the expense of
increasing communication by a factor of ( k+t&1t&1 ).
Theorem 8. Let P be any 1-round, k-database, t-private PIR scheme with com-
munication complexity (:k (n), ;k (n)). Then, there exists a 1-round, (k+t)-database,
t-private SPIR scheme SP with communication complexity (O(m(:k (n)+Wlog2 nX),
O(m;k (n))) and shared randomness complexity O(mn), where m=( k+t&1t&1 ).
Proof. A t-private SPIR scheme SP using K=k+t databases DB1 , ..., DBK is
described in the following. The construction uses a collection F=[S1 , ..., Sm ,
Sm+1]2[K] of database sets such that:
v Sm+1 is a singleton;
v each other set Sh , 1hm, is of size k;
v for any set T[K] of size t, there exists a set S # F such that T & S=<.
Such F exists with m=( k+t&1t&1 ). E.g., let Sm+1=[K], and for any subset T[K]
of size t such that K # T, let ST=[K]"T.12
An honest-user SPIR scheme can now proceed as follows (where all actions are
performed using one round of communication):
v The user U picks m random shift amounts 21 , 22 , ..., 2m # Zn ; The databases
hold m shared random strings r1 , ..., rm , of length n each, and let r0=x denote the
data string.
v For 1 jm, U sends 2j to each database in Sj , and invokes the PIR
scheme P with database set S j to privately retrieve the bit bj in position
ij =
def i& j&1h=1 2j (mod n) of rj&1  (r j >>2j). (Note that, in particular, i1=i );
v U explicitly asks the single database in Sm+1 for the bit bm+1 in position
im+1 =
def i&mh=1 2h (mod n) of rm ;
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12 It is not hard to observe that the described F is of minimal cardinality and that it cannot exist at
all for K smaller than k+t. However, by increasing the number of databases K, the cardinality of F
can be decreased. For instance, m can be made as low as t when K=tk+1, corresponding to the
recursive scheme described above.
v U reconstructs xi by taking the exclusive-or of the m+1 bits b1 , ..., bm ,
bm+1 .
We now show that the scheme is correct, and that it satisfies both privacy
requirements. It follows by induction that for h=1, 2, ..., m, b1 b2  } } } bh=
xi  (rh) ih+1 , and so (b1 b2  } } } bm)bm+1=(xi  (rm) im+1)bm+1=xi .
This proves the correctness of the scheme.
To prove the user’s privacy, consider the view of a collusion T of t databases.
Since P is t-private, invocations of P involving members of T do not disclose any
information about i. The only potential source of information about i are those
messages from the set [21 , 22 , ..., 2m , im+1] that are viewed by members of T.
However, the definition of F guarantees that the collusion T will only view a
proper subset of these messages, which contains no information on i.
To prove the data privacy (against an honest user), it suffices to show that given any
shift amounts 21 , ..., 2m and position im+1 picked by the user, the random variable
(x (r1>>21), r1  (r2>>22), r2  (r3>>23), ..., rm&1  (rm>>2m), (rm) im+1),
where the strings r1 , ..., rm are uniformly and independently distributed over [0, 1]n,
depends only on the single data bit xi , where i=im+ 2h . This can be proved by
iterating the argument used in the proof of Theorem 1. Letting r0=x, it can be
shown by backward induction on h that for h=m&1, m&2, ..., 0, the joint distribu-
tion (rh  (rh+1>>2h+1), rh+1  (rh+2>>2h+2), ..., rm&1  (rm>>2m), (rm) im+1) is
independent of rh given (rh) ih , where ih=im+1+2m+2m&1+ } } } +2h+1 (mod n).
In particular, for i=0 we obtain the desired result.
Finally, the same conditional disclosure mechanism used in the proof of
Theorem 3 can be used here as well to guarantee data privacy against any (possibly
dishonest) user. Specifically, in any invocation of P involving database set Sh , each
answer should be disclosed subject to the condition that all corresponding shift
amounts sent by the user are equal. The above analysis shows that this suffices to
guarantee data privacy.
Aside from the conditional disclosure protocol, the communication in the resul-
tant scheme SP involves m invocations of the scheme P, m extra log n-bit query
strings, and one extra answer bit. The conditional disclosure protocol induces a
constant multiplicative communication and shared randomness overhead. This
gives the communication and randomness bounds stated in the theorem. K
6.3. Private Retrieval with Costs
In this subsection we briefly sketch how the conditional disclosure of secrets
methodology can be used together with an underlying SPIR scheme to implement
private retrieval with costs.
Let i1 , ..., im denote the indices of the data records which the user wishes to
retrieve,13 c denote a public vector of l-bit integral costs (an n-tuple whose i th
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13 m will be disclosed to the database as an upper bound on the number of data records that the user
wishes to retrieve. If the user wants to retrieve less than m records, the rest of the indices will point to
a dummy record of cost 0.
entry ci contains a binary representation of the cost of the i th data record
(0ci2l&1)), and p denote a public cost threshold (i.e., the amount of money
paid by the user). A scheme for private retrieval with costs allows the user to
retrieve the data records indexed by i1 , ..., im privately (namely without giving the
database any information about i1 , ..., im), provided that mh=1 cihp (i.e., the total
cost of the records does not exceed the amount prepaid by the user); on the other
hand, it should not allow the user to obtain any information which does not follow
from such valid set of records.
The following is a high-level description of a generic implementation of such a
scheme, using an underlying (1-round) SPIR scheme S. Without loss of generality
(but possibly with a small complexity overhead), we may assume that the
reconstruction function applied by the user in S depends on the answers alone, and
not on the index i or its random input \. (See Remark 3; also, note that this is
already the case with the schemes B"k constructed in Section 5.) The scheme can
then proceed as follows.
Queries: The user chooses independently, for each desired retrieval index ih of
x (1hm), a k-tuple of queries according to the scheme S. It sends to each of
the k databases the m corresponding messages (all in parallel).
Answers: Each database locally computes two answers to each of the user’s
queries: one by considering x as the data string and the other by considering
the cost vector c as the data string (more precisely, c is considered as l n-bit
vectors and the l answers can be used to construct the l-bit entry cih). Then, the
databases conditionally disclose their x-answers subject to an appropriate condition
on the c-answers. That is, the condition on the c-answers should assert that the
sum of the costs reconstructed from these answers (each of which can be obtained
by applying the reconstruction function of S) is no larger than the public
threshold p.
The complexity of realizing conditional disclosure as above can be kept low in
the following ways. First, it is better to use an underlying scheme S whose
reconstruction function is computationally easy (this is the case with the schemes
constructed in this paper). Second, it is possible to facilitate the realization of dis-
closures under complicated conditions by requiring the user to send a witness to the
validity of its queries, which will serve as an additional input to the condition. In
this setting, the general upper bounds given in Theorem 2 can be extended to apply
to nondeterministic formulas or span programs, yielding efficient conditional dis-
closure protocols whenever the condition can be computed by an efficient circuit.
Indeed, letting the witness supplied by the user consist of all intermediate gate
values, it is possible to verify that the circuit evaluates to 1 using a Boolean formula
whose size is linear in the circuit size. Since addition of m l-bit integers can be
computed by a circuit of size O(lm), the amount of communication required for
disclosing each answer bit14 is O(lm) plus m times the size of circuitry required for
reconstructing the selected costs from the c-answers.
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14 In each of the schemes constructed in Section 5, there exists a single answer bit which, when
eliminated from the user’s view, makes the user learn no information about the data.
APPENDIX A. NECESSITY OF SHARED RANDOMNESS
A.1. Shared Randomness is Necessary for SPIR
In this section we show that the addition of a shared randomness resource to the
basic PIR setting is in a sense minimal.
Suppose we allow the databases to use private randomness in answering the
user’s queries, but we still do not allow them to interact without the mediation of
the user (and in particular we do not allow them to share a random string
unknown to the user). We argue that in this setting, (information-theoretic) SPIR
cannot be implemented at all, regardless of its complexity, even when the user is
honest.
Claim 2. There exists no (multiround) k-database SPIR scheme without direct
interaction between different databases, even if the databases are allowed to hold
private and independent random inputs and the user is honest.
Proof. Since the user’s view includes all of the communication, the strong
privacy requirement implies that any single database DBj cannot respond to the
user’s queries in a way that depends on the data string x. Formally, at any round
the distribution of DBj ’s answer given the previous communication cannot depend
on x. For otherwise, this answer distribution must either not follow from a single
bit xi , thus violating the data-privacy requirement, or alternatively reveal to DBj
the index i on which it depends, thus violating the user’s privacy. The independence
of private random inputs held by different databases implies that given previous
communication the answers of different databases must be independently dis-
tributed. Combining the observations made above we have that the joint distribu-
tion of all k answers given previous communication is independent of x. Fixing an
index i, it follows by induction on the number of rounds that for any w>0 the
accumulated communication in the first w rounds is distributed independent of x.
This implies that the user’s output cannot depend on the value of xi , contradicting
the correctness requirement. K
As a special case of Claim 2 we may conclude the following:
Corollary 2. There exists no single-database (information-theoretic) SPIR
scheme.
We note that Corollary 2 can also be derived from known results about two-
party computation [13, 22, 2].
A.2. Shared Randomness in General Reduction from SPIR to PIR
We have shown above that the resource of shared randomness is necessary in
order for SPIR to be achievable. In Section 3 we have presented general transfor-
mations from PIR to SPIR using linear shared randomness and in Sections 4 and
5 and specific transformations using about the same shared randomness as the
communication complexity.
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A natural question concerning the general transformations is whether their
shared randomness complexity can be reduced, possibly as a function of their com-
munication complexity. We now argue that if we want the general reduction to
apply to any PIR scheme, then its shared randomness complexity (in the informa-
tion-theoretic honest user case) is in a sense minimal; that is, the uniform distribu-
tion on [0, 1]n from which the shared random string is chosen cannot be replaced
by a distribution on [0, 1]n whose entropy is less than n. It is straightforward to
observe that this is the case with the trivial 1-database PIR scheme in which the
database sends the entire data string to the user; the following claim indicates that
this is also the case for PIR schemes with arbitrarily small communication com-
plexity.
Claim 3. Any PIR scheme of which one answer bit gives the Boolean ‘‘OR ’’ of all
data bits requires the shared random string r in the scheme of Theorem 1 to be
uniformly distributed over [0, 1]n.
Proof. Let R denote the distribution on [0, 1]n from which r is picked, and sup-
pose that R is not uniform; for n2, it easily follows that there exist y, y$ # [0, 1]n
and an index i # [n] such that yi= y$i , and Pr[R= y]{Pr[R= y$]. Let SRP denote
the scheme SP constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 with the shared random
string r distributed according to R, and consider an invocation of SRP in which the
user’s retrieval index is i and the specified shift is 2=0. Now, observe that in this
invocation the user can distinguish between the data strings y and y$, as
Pr _ j # [n]( yR) j=0&=Pr[R= y]
{Pr[R= y$]=Pr _ j # [n] ( y$R)=0& .
By the correctness of SRP , the user must also learn the i th data bit, implying that
it obtains more than a single physical bit of data. K
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